Handler on Duty: Didier Stevens
Threat Level: green
| Published | 2026-09-29 04:17:55 |
|---|---|
| Last Modified | 2026-09-29 04:17:55 |
| AKA | CVE-2026-102422 |
| Summary | shell-quote's `quote()` function emits a `{ comment }` token as `#` followed by its text, which comments out the rest of the shell line, including the opening quote of any later string token. A line terminator (\n, \r, U+2028, U+2029) in that later string therefore ends the comment, and the rest of the string is parsed as shell input: `quote(['echo', 'ok', { comment: 'x' }, 'a\nid;#'])` runs `id` in sh, bash, dash, ksh and zsh. `parse()` emits a comment token for a `#` in the middle of a word (for example `http://example.com/#frag`), so callers that combine `parse()` output with another untrusted string, such as `quote(parse(untrustedCommand).concat(untrustedArg))`, are affected. The fix for CVE-2026-9277 rejected line terminators in the comment's own text, but not in the tokens after it. Fixed in 1.11.0: `quote()` throws a `TypeError` when a string after a `{ comment }` token contains a line terminator. |
| Access Vector | Local | Adjacent | Network |
|---|---|---|---|
| Access Complexity | Low | Medium | High |
| Authentication | None | Single | Multiple |
| Confidentiality | None | Partial | Complete |
| Integrity | None | Partial | Complete |
| Availability | None | Partial | Complete |
