Handler on Duty: Johannes Ullrich
Threat Level: green
Podcast Detail
SANS Stormcast Tuesday, April 28th, 2026: More TeamPCP; Citrix XenServer Unpatched Vulns; Phantom RPC;
If you are not able to play the podcast using the player below: Use this direct link to the audio file: https://traffic.libsyn.com/securitypodcast/9908.mp3
My Next Class
Click HERE to learn more about classes Johannes is teaching for SANS
TeamPCP Update
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/TeamPCP%20Supply%20Chain%20Campaign%3A%20Update%20008%20-%2026-Day%20Pause%20Ends%20with%20Three%20Concurrent%20Compromises%20%28Checkmarx%20KICS%2C%20Bitwarden%20CLI%20Cascade%2C%20xinference%20PyPI%29%2C%20CanisterSprawl%20npm%20Worm%20Identified%2C%20and%20Tier%201%20Coverage%20Returns/32926
https://socket.dev/blog/73-open-vsx-sleeper-extensions-glassworm
https://checkmarx.com/blog/checkmarx-security-update-april-26/
89 vulnerabilities in XAPI / Citrix XenServer
https://shittrix.moksha.dk/#rationale
Phantom RPC
https://securelist.com/phantomrpc-rpc-vulnerability/119428/
Pi-Hole Vulnerability CVE-2026-41489
https://github.com/pi-hole/pi-hole/security/advisories/GHSA-6w8x-p785-6pm4
Linux Kernel Problem CVE-2026-41651
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41651
Discussion
CVE-2026-41651 doesn't appear to have anything to do with the Linux Kernel ? It's a PackageKit/D-Bus issue. I've not *listened* yet to see if this is only an issue with the text summary here.
Posted by Athanasius on Tue Apr 28 2026, 08:04
Login here to join the discussion.
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | San Diego | May 11th - May 16th 2026 |
| Network Monitoring and Threat Detection In-Depth | Online | Arabian Standard Time | Jun 20th - Jun 25th 2026 |
| Network Monitoring and Threat Detection In-Depth | Riyadh | Jun 20th - Jun 25th 2026 |
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Washington | Jul 13th - Jul 18th 2026 |
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Online | British Summer Time | Jul 27th - Aug 1st 2026 |
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Las Vegas | Sep 21st - Sep 26th 2026 |
Podcast Transcript
Hello and welcome to the Tuesday, April 28, 2026 edition of the SANS Internet Storm Center's Stormcast. My name is Johannes Ullrich, recording today from Jacksonville, Florida. And this episode is brought to you by the SANS.edu Graduate Certificate Program in Industrial Control System Security. Ken today wrote a quick update on the latest developments in TeamPCP style attacks and of course one of the big developments last week was Checkmarx and a couple of the other companies affected by this Bitwarden. I mentioned both last week. Now for Checkmarx there is one kind of interesting new development that apparently the entire GitHub repository was leaked as part of the attack. They don't state how severe this is, if there are any secrets in this GitHub repository or not. But they do state that this all is really sort of just a follow-on left over from an attack that started March 23rd, so about a month ago. They wrote back then about this attack on March 23rd, but now they basically linked those two attacks and yes, that's sort of one of the big news items here. Just in general as far as I know current state of supply chain attacks go, we also have a new blog post by socket.dev and they're writing about 73 different OpenVSX extensions that they found that basically linked to Classform which is well a typical credential exfiltration. So again you know more opportunities here for developers to lose their credentials and with that sort of new entry points being found by attackers for additional supply chain attacks once they hit a developer for a major package then of course they can start the cycle all over again. Well we have some bad news for users of Citrix Xen server or the XAPI which is the API that comes with Xen server. Researcher Jakob Wolfheckel did release a blog post outlining 89 different vulnerabilities that Jakob discovered in Citrix Xen server. There has been very limited notice provided to the XCP-NG project which is the open source implementation of this. There was no notice really provided about this so there are also no patches or anything available from Citrix themselves. In part this was due to some of the prior behavior of the Cloud Software Group which is the private equity fund that owns Citrix Xen server by not acknowledging researchers or really trying to downplay vulnerabilities. Remember for example the famous Citrix fleet which sort of keeps reoccurring in part because well essentially the same vulnerability exists in several spots of the code and well the Cloud Software Group hasn't really sort of gotten around or put the resources behind actually finding these vulnerabilities more proactively. Overall as a user of Citrix Xen server well hopefully there will be an update available soon but at this point really best thing you can do probably is limit access to the API and with that hopefully well reduce at least the likelihood of being compromised. On the other hand the blog post by Jakob also points out that you should assume compromise as these vulnerabilities have been around basically since the beginning of Citrix Xen server and well were really all that terribly difficult to find. There is no note here as far as I have been seeing it about any use of AI or so in finding these vulnerabilities. They seem to have been found well in such a good old-fashioned way. But well it's not just Citrix users that have to worry about unpatched vulnerabilities being disclosed. We also have a blog post by Kaspersky that discloses an architectural issue with Windows RPC. They're calling it Phantom RPC. So RPC services are dealing with a lot of these sort of system background kind of stuff in Windows and have the ability to act as another user. That's being abused here by providing a non-existing RPC service. So exactly what happens here is that a client may try to reach out to an RPC service that for every reason does not exist. The attacker is establishing a malicious version of that RPC service and then essentially tricking the client, connecting to it to execute code as another user. That's sort of the overall trick here. There is of course a lot more behind this if you're interested in the details. Take a look at the blog post. It's a privilege escalation vulnerability. So nothing sort of remote code execution or such that we had of course in RPC services before. But still an interesting vulnerability and we'll have to see how Microsoft will address this given that currently there's sort of no provision to actually better authenticate any of the RPC services. And they have been around forever. So there's also a huge backward compatibility problem here. Well and that's it for today. Also vulnerability I didn't get to cover in a pie hole. So definitely get that patched. And also privilege escalation vulnerability in Linux. But it doesn't sound as severe as Phantom RPC. So that's it for today. And talk to you again tomorrow. Bye. Bye. Bye. Bye. Bye. Bye. Bye.





